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S:It is. submitted that such conclusions are the product of .a
false 'logic. Indeed, there is, first of all, no more reason for saying the: parent is not liable in case the minor's wrong is both,
tortious and in breach of contract than .there is for saying that
he:is liable. Is a harm less a tort because the wrongdoer caused
it -while: under contract - unless the contract absolves him of
liability- or because contract law quite independently of tort.
law would also make him liable for it? Let it be assumed that
the contract is invalid - as the courts said it was in Simoneaux
and may have considered it to be in Nunez- would there not,
be, even under the logic employed by the decisions, even more
reason to recognize the liability in tort?
What has been said above does not deny that in particular
cases liability may not exist because of other reasons. Thus, in
Simoneaux the court found the insured "himself at fault" in allowing the minor to drive his automobile after the minor's
father had told the insured he did not wish his son to do so. So,
too, though this does not appear in the opinion, the insured in
Nunez may have rented the airplane to the minor knowing him,
to be such and not to have the authorization of his father. In
such a -case, perhaps non-liability of the father might be based
on an assumption of risk by the insured. But, regardless of the
merit of such possible defenses, it can hardly be said that one
is not liable in tort simply because he was in contractual relationship with the one wronged.

PROPERTY
Alvin B. Rubin* and Harry R. Sachse**
NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
State v. Cenac' involved a state claim to ownership of the bed
of a navigable lake which had been patented to the defendants'
author in title. The defense was the six-year liberative prescrip*Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar. ,
.**Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
!-,
Bar.,
1. 132 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), writ refused, 241 La. 1055, 132
So. 2d 928 (1961). Accord, Olin Gas Transmission Corp. v. Harrison, 132 So. 2d
:.
721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied Nov. 6, 1961.
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tive period against suits to set aside state patents. 2 The state
conceded that the decision in California Co. v. Price3 holding.
that this prescriptive period would run against the state and.
would bar the state's assertion of title to the bed of a navigable
waterway was "squarely in point," but contended that this decision, and the prior cases on which it was based, should be
overruled.
The court of appeal characterized the state's contention that
it had authority to set aside the prior decision by the Supreme
Court as "astounding," stating it was not "unaware of its sheer
fantasy and total lack of reason or legal foundation." The court
then reviewed the prior jurisprudence dealing with the question
and concluded that these decisions constituted "an insurmountable obstacle to the state's claim."
The real importance of the case, however, lies in the denial
of certiorari by the Supreme Court. The court stated, "we find
no error of law in the ruling complained of." Justices Hawthorne, Hamlin, and Sanders were of the opinion that the application for a writ should be granted. But Justice Fournet, who
had dissented from the majority opinion in California Co. v.
Price, concurred in the refusal to grant the application with
written reasons, stating:
"While it may be considered regrettable that I was unable
to convince my learned colleagues of the far reaching effect.
of that decision at the time, I do not feel that this Court can
now in good conscience afford to deal differently with respect to the rights of all other such patents ....
Indeed there
would be no stability of titles in this state if every time there
is a change of membership of this Court previously adjudicated rights are to be changed to accord with the views of
the individual members as newly composed."
This action by the Supreme Court should end the speculation that the state might be able literally to regain the ground
which it lost as a result of the line of decisions culminating in
California Co. v. Price. However, in view of the amounts of
money involved and the state's present fiscal plight, it can
hardly be doubted that the state will make yet another effort to
convince one more Supreme Court Justice that all of the beds
of navigable bodies of water - and particularly all of the min2. LA. R.S. 9:5661 (1950).

3. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1953).
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erals lying under them- belong to the state notwithstanding
patents to private owners and the apparent running of prescriptive periods against attacking those patents.
The Civil Code provides three basic situations in which the
movement of a river or stream (whether navigable or not) may
change the ownership of riparian property. Articles 509 and
510 provide that where a river or other stream successively and
imperceptibly adds soil to a bank, the riparian owner adjacent
to the newly deposited or exposed land acquires ownership of
the land. Where a river or stream suddenly opens a new bed,
Article 518 is applicable, rather than the articles on accretion
and dereliction. Under this article no change is made in the
ownership of the land between the old bed and the new bed as
would be the case with accretion and dereliction, but the owner
of the soil taken by the new bed is given ownership of the old
bed as indemnification for the land lost. A third possibility is
envisaged by Article 511 of the Civil Code, which provides that
when a river or stream by a sudden eruption carries away a
considerable tract of land from one field and deposits it at another place in such a manner that the property is susceptible of
being identified, the owner of the land carried away may claim
his property if he does so within a year or before it is possessed
by the person to whose property it becomes attached.
While the first two situations (imperceptible change
and the
opening of a new bed) occur frequently, the third situation, that
of a piece of land being washed down a river and deposited
intact at another area, would be a noteworthy geological phenomenon. Whether this could ever happen is doubtful but, in
any event, there is no evidence that Article 511 of the Civil Code,
dealing with such circumstances, has ever been utilized.
In Stephens v. Drake,4 the plaintiff in an action of jactitation owned a peninsula of land on the Red River. After a flood;
the river took a new course, cutting off a large section of the
peninsula and leaving an ox-bow lake where the old bend had
been. The defendant, the riparian owner of the other side of the
old river bed, claimed ownership to the portion of the peninsula
between the old river bed and the new bed, alleging that the
land had been carried away and deposited against his land more
than one year before and, apparently, alleging possession. The
4. 134 So.2d 674 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961),,cert. denied Jan. 15, 1962.
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Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the holding. of:,the

lower court to the effect that there was no carrying awayof ,the
land as contemplated in Article 511 of the Civil Code but, rather,
a change in the bed of the river or stream as contemplated in
Article 518. Thus, the plaintiff did not lose ownership: of the
portion of the old peninsula between the old river bed and the
new. Furthermore, under Article 518, the plaintiff was decreed
to be the owner of the old channel of the river.
This case provides a good illustration of the proper application of the law concerning the movement of rivers. It also gives
an example of the aleatory quality of riparian ownership. The
state formerly owned the bed of the river which encircled the
plaintiff's peninsula.5 When the river changed its bed to go
across the neck of the peninsula, it necessarily took a shorter
route than the old ox-bow. Thus, the plaintiff lost the small area
taken by the new bed of the river and apparently gained from
the state the much larger area that constituted the old river bed.
On the other hand, the state gained and the riparian owners lost
property while the bow was being formed and while the area
covered by the bed of the river was thereby being increased.
BOUNDARIES

6 raises the issue
The case of Baudin v. Charrier
of the difference between the acquisitive prescription of thirty years
under Article 852 of the Civil Code and under Articles 34993505. Where estates are contiguous, each proprietor has a right
to compel his neighbor to fix the limits of their properties.7 To
establish the boundary, the titles of the respective parties must
be examined to determine the theoretical or ideal boundary, but
this determination is not conclusive. Article 852 of the Civil
Code provides, in effect, that the person who stands to lose by
the drawing of the ideal boundary will be permitted to retain
his land if he can show that either he, or those under whom he
holds, have enjoyed uninterrupted possession of the land in question during thirty years.

A long line of jurisprudence, of which perhaps the most illustrious case is Opdenwyer v. Brown," has distinguished the
thirty-year prescription described in Article 852 from that of
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 453
6. 137 So.2d 440 (La. App.
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 823
8. 155 La. 617, 99 So. 482,

(1870).
3d Cir. 1962).
(1870).
(1924).
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Articles 3499-3505. Under the jurisprudence, to prescribe under
Article 852. requires visible boundaries but does not require a
juridical link for the "tacking" of possession, while prescription
under Articles 3499-3505 requires a juridical link for "tacking"
but is not dependent upon visible boundaries.
The validity of this dichotomy is doubtful. The French Civil
Code, from which our prescriptive articles were copied, although
providing an action to establish boundaries, does not provide
special prescriptive rules in boundary actions. 9 The redactor's
comment on Article 848 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
(now Article 852 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870) does not
reveal any intention to establish a separate rule of prescription
for boundary matters. 10 It seems more likely that the intention
was to make it clear that, in determining a boundary, the legal
boundary is not always what might be shown in the titles of the
parties, because ownership may have changed through acquisitive prescription. The slight differences of language between
Article 852 and the general articles on prescription may have
arisen from the abbreviated form in which Article 852 mentions
concepts described in detail in the general articles on prescription. 1 Further, the Louisiana Civil Code contains numerous inaccuracies, particularly where articles not found in the French
Civil Code were added by the redactors, as was the case with
Article 852. Justice St. Paul, in the Opdenwyer case, may have
been too charitable when he stated that the redactors of our
Code "understood perfectly the language they used, and wrote
12
what they wrote, not hastily but with extreme care."'
In Baudin v. Charrier, the plaintiff and defendant had acquired their property from a common ancestor. The plaintiff
art. 646.
10. The comment merely states: "The rules of prescription certainly require,
that one cannot prescribe against his own title. (Code Art. 48, p. 485). But this
means, that one cannot change at his own pleasure the cause and principle of
his possession, and it does not prevent a person from prescribing beyond his title.
Thus, it is conceded that the purchaser of a piece of land designated as containing one arpent can, by prescription, extend his right to a greater quantity, as a
stranger could do without title, that is by possession of thirty years." 1 LouisiANA LzGAL.ARcHIVES, PROJECT OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 101 (1942).
11. The apparent difference in the right to utilize the possession of prior
holders has, perhaps, been exaggerated in our jurisprudence by a restrictive interpretation of the right to add possessions under the general prescriptive articles.
'"Tacking" could have been allowed in all prescriptions of 30 years where there
ia a juridical link between the parties as to land contiguous to the disputed area,
even if the land in dispute is not described in the title. If this view had been
accepted, there would probably be no difference in the right "to make the sum
of possessions" under the two sets of articles.
12. 155 La. 617, 624, 99 So. 482, 484 (1924).
9. FRENCH CIVIL CODE

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

brought an action to establish a boundary, and the court-appointed surveyor determined that the tract of the common ancestor contained less than it had been described as containing.
Thus, under Article 851 of the Civil Code, each lot would have
to be reduced proportionately "in the absence of possession by
one or more of the parties sufficient to establish prescription."
The north and south boundaries of the land in question were
fixed by a fence and a bayou. The defendant owned the tract
immediately to the west of the plaintiff and for twenty years
farmed beyond his boundary to a certain turn-row. After twenty years, the defendant, by agreement with the plaintiff's ancestor in title, farmed even beyond the old turn-row to a new
turn-row and continued this farming operation in excess of an
additional ten years.
Judge Tate, of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in a careful and well-written opinion, held that the defendant's possession
of the property up to the old turn-row for thirty years was sufficient for thirty years acquisitive prescription. The opinion reviewed the line of cases distinguishing prescription under Article 852 and under Articles 3499-3505. The cases cited by the
plaintiff to the effect that defendant's possession was insufficient for lack of a visible boundary were distinguished on the
ground that those cases applied to possession under Article 852,
while in the instant case, by constant farming, the defendant's
possession was sufficient to acquire prescription under the general articles.
No question of "tacking" was at issue, as the defendant himself had possessed the property for thirty years. It is interesting to consider what the result would have been if the defendant and his ancestor had had to add their possesions together
to have thirty years possession and both had possessed beyond
their titles. Under the jurisprudence, since there was no visible
boundary, there would not have been sufficient possession for
prescription under Article 852, and since:there was not a juridical link, the possession would not be sufficient under Articles
3499-3505.
The anomaly of our present jurisprudence on fixing boundaries is further demonstrated in the recent case of Aycock v.
3
Carter.'.
The defendant in a boundary action, as in the Charrier
13. 141 So.2d 45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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case, claimed possession beyond his title, but made the additional
claim that there had actually been a fence (rather than a mere
turn-row) marking the extent of his possession. The court of
appeal rejected defendant's claim because he had not shown that
the fence had been in existence and continually maintained for
thirty years. If the reasoning of the Charrier case were to be
applied, it might be irrelevant whether the fence had been maintained for thirty years, if there had been possession by farming
up to the boundary supposedly marked by the fence for a period
of thirty years. The Aycock case relies on Sessum v. Hemperley, 14 which states the law as follows:
"Clearly, the now well-established rule, as a result of our
codal provisions and the cited authorities, is that where there
is a visible boundary which has been in existence for thirty
years or more and the defendant in a boundary action and
his predecessors in title have, in addition to the land described in the title, actually possessed land extending to that
visible boundary, a plea of prescription of thirty years should
be sustained. It is our view that for the rule to be applicable
two conditions must concur: First, there must be a visible
boundary, artificial or otherwise; second, there must be
actual uninterrupted possession, either in person or through
ancestors in title, for thirty years or more of the land extending beyond that described in the title and embraced within the visible bounds. The lack or failure of consent on the
part of the adjacent owner cannot affect the rights that
accrue by operation of law to the possessor under the thirtyyear prescriptive plea. We feel that the foregoing conditions
have been completely met in the instant case."
The court in the Aycock case may have concluded from the
language of the Sessum case that, where a boundary action is
involved, contrary to the Charrier case, there must be both a
visible boundary and continuous possession. Judge Tate's position seems more reasonable, namely, that if the requirements
of prescription under either Article 852 or Articles 3499-3505
are met, the boundary must be made accordingly. This is so, because the purpose of the boundary action is to show what the
parties presently own, and that must take into account what
they have acquired by prescription of any variety whatsoever.
*

The distinction between the prescription under Article 852
14. 23 La. 444, 476, 96 So.2d 832, 843 (1957).
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and Articles 3499-3505 is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence,
but both its origin and usefulness are questionable. The same
problems of setting boundaries have been handled under French
law without separate rules of prescription. It is hoped that in
any general revision of the Louisiana Civil Code this matter
will be re-examined.
In McMichael v. Williams,I5 a trespass action was converted
into a boundary action, but the decision of the trial court did
not follow the report of the surveyor appointed by the court. The
court of appeal held that in the absence of proof to the contrary,
the survey must be considered correct. Inasmuch as the record
did not show that all of the formalities of the survey had been
complied with, the court remanded the case so that the surveyor's testimony might. be taken.
McDaniels v. Miller 6 was a similar case in which the plaintiff alleged trespass and the defendant reconvened to have the
boundary fixed. The surveyor appointed by the court did not
make a proces verbal as required by Articles 833 and 834 of the
Civil Code and ignored certain other formalities. The trial court
nevertheless fixed the boundaries. The court of appeal held that
the survey was an absolute nullity, that the boundary could not
be fixed without a proper survey, and that it could not be determined if defendant had trespassed until the boundary had
been fixed. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
In Brashears v. Hood'7 the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit held that a plaintiff who instituted a boundary action
without first offering to fix the disputed boundary extrajudicially in accordance with the procedures set forth in the section
of the Civil Code beginning with Article 832 should be cast for
costs of the suit,' 8 but that the expense of establishing the
boundary should be divided equally between the parties. 19 The
court also held that ownership of the property lying between
15. 138 So.2d 22 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
16. 136 So.2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
17. 137 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
18. Of. Lucas v. Asset Realization Co., 51 So.2d 652 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951)
holding that "where there is a bona fide boundary dispute and a judicial determination of the boundary is the only possible means for a final settlement of
the dispute, costs of the proceedings should be divided between the parties . ..."
Id. at 658. The court there observed that "it is not shown that plaintiff arbitrarily
or capriciously refused to enter into negotiations with the defendants before filing
suit'. .. . We doubt whether the parties could ever have reached an amicable
agreement as to a fixing of the boundary . . . ." Ibid.
19. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 663 (1870).
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the disputed boundaries should not be adjudicated in the absence
of an express prayer for this relief; instead, the court should
merely declare the right to possession of the property disputed
in the boundary action.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS

The courts continue to confront new problems in the interpretation and application of building restrictions. One question
which frequently arises is whether the violation of one restriction for more than two years 20 causes prescription to accrue
against the enforcement of other covenants contained in the
same set of restrictions. The language of the statute which enacted the prescriptive period indicates clearly that the property
2' 1
is free only "from the restriction which has been violated.
However, when the property is freed from the restriction which
has been violated, is that restriction wholly set aside, or is the
restriction still enforceable for other purposes?
In Olivier v. Berggren22 the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
said that the use of a lot for a commercial purpose in violation
of a restriction limiting its use to construction of a single family
dwelling would not so invalidate the restriction as to permit the
lot to/be used for a two-family dwelling.
The violation of a restriction in one respect should not
wholly abrogate that restriction. Granting this, there appears
to be an undue literalness in the court's application of the rule
to the facts of the present case. A failure to object to a greater
violation should presumably bar a later objection to lesser violations. If property is free for commercial use by virtue of a
failure to object to such use for the statutory prescriptive period, it should be likewise available for multifamily residences.
Because of the restrictive effect of these covenants, doubts conshould be resolved in favor of free
cerning their interpretation
23
property.
the
of'
use
The existence of restrictive covenants which would prevent
the use of immovable property for the purpose for which the
buyer proposes to employ it has been held sufficient to justify
20.
21.
22.
"1-1.23.
(1938).

LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950).
Id.
A.
136 So.2d 325 (La. App. 4th Cir., 1962).
See 14 AM. JUr. COVENANTS,: CONDITIONS

;AND

RESTRICTIONS

§ 212
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the buyer's rejecting title. Where the proposed buyer is a public
body, does the same rule apply? The Louisiana courts have
never determined whether restrictive covenants would apply
against a public body which acquires and uses the land for a
24
public purpose. The decisions in other states are conflicting.
In one case which came before the Supreme Court, a school
board had agreed to purchase property for use as a school site.
Upon examination of title the property was found to be subject
to a restrictive covenant, which would, if enforceable, restrict
use of the land to residential purposes. The Supreme Court refused to decree specific performance of the purchase agreement.25 The title was "suggestive of serious litigation," and the
court would not undertake to resolve the issue of enforceability
of the restrictions in a matter to which the other landowners
who would be affected by its decision were not parties.

SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
In Succession of Gaudin,' the First Circuit Court of Appeal
was called upon to decide whether extrinsic evidence establishing the testator's custom of using the slash date form to indicate
month, day and year, in that order, was sufficient as determinative that an olographic testament dated "9/12/55" was actually
dated September 12, 1955. Although the question of whether
extrinsic evidence should be admitted in the first place had
already been decided in the affirmative five years previously
when the case was before the court the first time, 2 it nevertheless took occasion to reaffirm its position on this question
and thus held that extrinsic evidence is not only admissible to
ascertain an otherwise ambiguous date, but that the evidence
adduced by the proponents was sufficient to resolve the ambiguity.
24. See 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.73 (3d ed. 1950) ; 18 AM. JU.
Eminent Domain § 157 (1938).

25. Gremillion v. Rapides Parish School Board, 242 La. 967, 140 So.2d 377
(1962).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962),
2. Succession of Gaudin, 98 So. 2d 711

1958.

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied

